### 1

**A. Discourses of danger reproduces an American identity – that posits the US as a the defender of global freedom and liberty**

**Campbell, 98**- Professor of International Politics University of Newcastle (David, Writing Security: United States Foreign Policy and the Politics of Identity)

The crisis of representation the United States faces is unique only in the particularities of its content. The form of the dilemma is something common to all states. The state has never been a stable ground on which a fixed identity has been secured against danger: the variety of state forms throughout modernity have always been a historically contingent panoply of practices that have served to constitute identity through the negation of difference and the temptation of otherness. With the intensification of state power in the late nineteenth century, Foreign Policy helped contain and discipline the identities to which foreign policy had given rise. In our late modern era, where we find proliferating challenges that cannot be readily contained within the state, the discourse of danger associated with the discursive economy of foreign policy/Foreign Policy will have to work overtime to overcome the ever present threats to the once stable representation of an always unstable sovereign domain. The discursive economy of foreign policy will thus be taxed in its efforts to reproduce and contain challenges to the political identity of nations such as the United States. However, for (the United States of) America— which I have argued is the imagined community par excellence, the state that requires a discourse of danger probably more than any other— the crisis of representation is particularly acute. The operation of anticommunism as a prominent discourse of danger in the United States throughout the nineteenth and twentieth centuries— with its ability to encompass the entire population, intensively structure the practices of everyday life, and offer a link between internal and external threats in ways that circumscribe the boundaries of legitimacy— is probably the best example of an effective discourse of danger. But with (as discussed in the Introduction) the globalization of contingency, the erasure of the markers of certainty, and the rarefaction of political discourse, reproducing the identity of "the United States" and containing challenges to it are likely to require new discourses of danger. Of course, talk of a shift from old to new discourses of danger drastically oversimplifies the complexity of this cultural terrain. Transformations of this kind do not occur in discrete or sequential stages, for there has always been more than one referent around which danger has crystallized. What appears as new is often the emergence of something previously obscured by that which has faded away or become less salient. In this context, there is no shortage on the horizons of world politics of potential candidates for new discourses of danger (such as AIDS, "terrorism," and the general sign of anarchy and uncertainty). Consider just one example. The environment has occasionally emerged as an international discourse of danger. For example, a focus on the environmental catastrophes of Eastern Europe has been prominent. 2 One of the effects of this interpretation has been to reinscribe East-West understandings of global politics in a period of international transformation by suggesting that "they" in the East are technologically less sophisticated and ecologically more dangerous than "we" in the West. This produces a new boundary that demarcates the "East" from the "West" in a period when the old frontiers of identity are no longer sustainable. But environmental danger can also be figured in a manner that challenges traditional forms of identity inscribed in the capitalist economy of the "West." As a discourse of danger that results in disciplinary strategies that are de-territorialized, involve communal cooperation, and refigure economic relationships, the environment can serve to enframe a different rendering of "reasoning man" than that associated with the subjectivities of liberal capitalism, thereby making it more unstable and undecidable than anticommunism. 3 The major issues regarding the possible emergence of a new discourse of danger(s) in this period can be indicated by some questions. In terms of the reproduction of American identity along the lines established in the cold war, will any of the likely candidates be as extensive or intensive as that which they are needed to replace? In other words, are we going to witness the persistence of cold war practices even after their most recent objects of contention have passed on? Will these practices be represented in the mode of the society of security? Or, alternatively, do any of the new dangers being focused on in this juncture contain the possibility for a different figuration of American identity that would diverge from the enmity of the cold war? These questions, dealing with the rewriting of security, inform the argument in the remaining chapters. To make the analysis more specific, the first task is to consider an issue that has been officially identified a danger or threat necessitating vigilance and defense in the (so-called) post-cold war world: the incidence of drug consumption in America. Before proceeding, an observation about the strategy of argumentation employed in this chapter is in order. It begins with a consideration of the claims of "fact" made by the policy discourses to support their articulation of danger. In discussing counterevidence, my intent is not to juxtapose one realm of fact with another. To the contrary, my desire is to demonstrate that within each realm of policy discourse it is possible to construct, in its own terms, a competing narrative that denaturalizes and unsettles the dominant way of constructing the world, thus prying open the space for an alternative interpretation concerned with the entailments of identity. Indeed, although I begin this chapter by operating largely within the terms of these policy discourses, I have attempted to politicize the terms of the debate. For example, instead of "the drug problem" or "drug abuse" I speak of "drug consumption"; instead of "drug users" or "addicts" I speak of "drug consumers" or "people addicted"; and instead of "drug traffickers" and "cartels" I speak of the "drug industry." Of course, no representation is neutral, and the terms of my discourse are certainly contestable, but their estranging quality is designed to help make obvious the way in which formulations of identity are sequestered within even the technical arguments of public policy with which we are most familiar. 4 As such, this consideration of contemporary discourses illustrates the relevance to the current period of the idea that foreign policy/Foreign Policy is constitutive of political identity.

**B. That makes extinction inevitable**

**Willson, 02**- Ph.D New College San Fransisco, Humanities, JD, American University (Brian, “Armageddon or Quantum Leap? U.S. Imperialism and Human Consciousness from an Evolutionary Perspective”, [**http://www.brianwillson.com/quantum.html**](http://www.brianwillson.com/quantum.html))

Awaiting the impending U.S. government's concocted "preventive" war against Iraq (indeed, against the world), this is perhaps one of the most frightening moments in human history. In a surreal scenario, the U.S. government is renewing active threats of using nuclear weapons and reviving use of anti-personnel land mines, and is introducing new technological weapons of death we can only imagine, and some we cannot. As grim as this scene is, I believe it must be the inevitable and logical extension of the continued growth ad nauseum of the American Way Of Life (AWOL) in particular, and the Western Way Of Life in general. Premeditated murder of thousands--perhaps millions--of innocents is the price for AWOL's insatiable consumption and its bloodthirsty vengeance, totally abdicating responsibility for lethal consequences to the planet and its species, including, ironically, our own. Perhaps Gaia is presenting the current transparent dangers to us as like a cosmic gift so that we might actually be able to *see* the extraordinary folly of our ways in time to creatively "storm the Bastille."U.S. Terrorist Roots U.S. civilization was founded on and has been sustained by terrorism, facilitated by Eurocentric racism, classism, and arrogant ethnocentrism. The grossest irony of all, of course, is that the "War on Terror," to be successful, must focus on our own civilization, the most egregious proponent of terror the world has even known. Terror was systematically utilized since our country's beginnings in the 1600s. The following instructions, facilitated by a cruel racism, are part of the historic record: "burning and spoiling the [Indian] country," (Captain John Underhill, Massachusetts Bay Colony, 1636); "put to death the [Pequot Indian] men of Block Island" (Massachusetts Bay Governor John Winthrop's order to Captain John Endecott, 1637); "laying waste," and instilling "terror...by any means" among the Indians (General George Washington, 1779); "[with] malice enough in our hearts to destroy everything that contributes to their support" (General John Sullivan, 1779).

In a prominent history book published in 1906 (*The History of the United States,* James Wilford Garner, Ph.D. and Henry Cabot Lodge, Ph.D, L.L.D), the "destruction" of the American Indian is explained as follows: "History teaches that inferior people must yield to a superior civilization....They must take on civilization or pass out. The Negro was able to endure slavery while learning the rudiments of civilization; the Indian could not endure slavery, and...refused to be taught." Attitudes uttered by white, Puritan, Christian men, civilian and military, thus set the tone for our civilization, sentiments that to this day have not been seriously renounced. We remain primarily a white male supremacy society with overtly expressed as well as suppressed sentiments of racism and classism dominating much of our political life and foreign policy. How can someone drop a bomb knowing that thousands of innocents will be murdered if the bomber is not possessed by cruel racism and/or ugly ethnocentrism? Conveniently left out of the historical record is the fact that our civilization has been founded on three holocausts, the first being theft of virtually all our land base at gunpoint while murdering millions of the original inhabitants. The second brought us "free" labor from Africa, but resulted in two-thirds of all those originally targeted for apprehension being murdered in the process of trying to escape or from being stowed as human cargo in slave ships known as floating coffins. The third holocaust took place during what the founder and publisher of *Time* and *Life* magazines, Thomas Luce, called "The American Century." This century witnessed more than 300 military and perhaps 10,000 covert interventions by the U.S. into more than 100 countries, stealing resources at gunpoint while murdering millions of the increasing numbers of impoverished people struggling for independence. "American exceptionalism" must succeed at *any* cost. In the process, the three Buddhist "poisons" are employed: greed -- for profit at any cost of human suffering; hatred -- of any obstacles to profit; ignorance -- of the intimate link between Western corporations/governments and "Third World" repressive regimes.  U.S. Oligarchy It does not matter which of the two parties, the republocrats or demoblicans, is in power. They both easily consented to the selection of their chief executive officer in violation of the rights of thousands of illegally disenfranchised Black voters, and of their Constitutional system itself that makes no provision for the Supreme Court to make such selection. Both believe in preserving the "national security" of AWOL, which means continued, unabated acceleration of extraction, consumption and pollution patterns, and obscene profits for the plutocrats and their bribed oligarchs in Washington. For all this to happen, Mr. Bush, indeed, has laid out the necessary plans for a world imperium to assure, in his and his cohorts' minds, continuation of our Western way of life, business- and profits-as-usual.  These oligarchs are not able to perceive the fact that further continuation of AWOL guarantees our destruction. They are not able to even consider the need for radical contraction and creative alternatives. They act as if blind drunk with their personal and political values of money and power, under the cloak of their disfigured version of Jesus. Unfortunately, the inevitable consequences of their business-as-usual forces are systematic destruction of virtually all sustainable ecosystems and human-created institutions.   Origins of "Civilization" Some history. As the revolution of urban civilization took root some 5,000 years ago the basic ingredients of "Western civilization" were introduced into our human evolutionary journey. The basic model of "civilization," for all but the most isolated and exceptional Indigenous groups, has seen the advent of powerful male oligarchs surrounded by elite bureaucracies of scribes and priests, overseeing hierarchies that involuntarily enforced large numbers of laborers, often violently captured during wars, to construct large projects for the pleasure of the king. Wars, systematic violence, and harsh class division originated with "civilizations." Secrecy of priestly knowledge about cosmic regularities and calendar-making assured that knowledge was monopolized by the small elite surrounding the oligarch. And the maxim, "the best defense is attack," was often used in early warfare, roots of our preventive strikes of today. According to Asian and Scandinavian scholars there have been nearly 15,000 wars during the last 5,000 years.   Extraordinarily Dangerous Trends The U.S. economy reveals increasing vulnerabilities to the fiction and hot air behind Wall Street and the continued exploitation and creation of misery upon which it is based. The U.S. regime has chosen to protect its illusion of omnipotence under the veil of fighting "terrorism" and its curtailing of civil liberties is similar to a police state. Increasingly desperate means used by people in power to maintain that power is a historically typical, predictable phenomenon. Never before, however, have oligarchs commanded so much power and possessed so many weapons of mass destruction, with explicit intentions to use such weapons preventively rather than defensively. I believe that we are at a pivotal point in history. We sit precariously perched on a ledge overlooking imminent extinction as a very real possibility at this juncture in our long, 7- to 8-million-year human evolutionary journey. Academics often talk about how history is cyclical, but two demonstrable trends, clearly not cyclical, indicate that we are dangerously near the end of our evolutionary branch

**C. Alternative text – reject the affirmative to desecuritize the Political. Vote negative to challenge securitization itself in favor of a political ethic that approaches problems in non-security terms and exposes the limits of their methodology.**

### 2

#### Economic engagement is a conditional QPQ

Shinn 96 [James Shinn, C.V. Starr Senior Fellow for Asia at the CFR in New York City and director of the council’s multi-year Asia Project, worked on economic affairs in the East Asia Bureau of the US Dept of State, “Weaving the Net: Conditional Engagement with China,” pp. 9 and 11, google books]

In sum, conditional engagement consists of a set of objectives, a strategy for attaining those objectives, and tactics (specific policies) for implementing that strategy.

* The objectives of conditional engagement are the ten principles, which were selected to preserve American vital interests in Asia while accommodating China’s emergence as a major power.
* The overall strategy of conditional engagement follows two parallel lines: economic engagement, to promote the integration of China into the global trading and financial systems; and security engagement, to encourage compliance with the ten principles by diplomatic and military means when economic incentives do not suffice, in order to hedge against the risk of the emergence of a belligerent China.
* The tactics of economic engagementshouldpromote China’s economic integration through negotiationsontrade liberalization, institution building, and educational exchanges. While a carrots-and-sticks approach may be appropriate within the economic arena, the use of trade sanction to achieve short-term political goals is discouraged.
* The tactics of security engagement should reduce the risks posed by China’s rapid military expansion, its lack of transparency, the proliferation of weapons of mass destruction, and transnational problems such as crime and illegal migration, by engaging in arms control negotiations, multilateral efforts, and a loosely-structured defensive military arrangement in Asia.8

[To footnotes]

8. Conditional engagement’s recommended tactics of tit-for-tat responses are equivalent to using carrots and sticks in response to foreign policy actions by China. Economic engagement calls for what is described as symmetric tit-for-tat and security engagement for asymmetric tit-for-tat. A symmetric response is one that counters a move by China in the same place, time, and manner; an asymmetric response might occur in another place at another time, and perhaps in another manner. A symmetric tit-for-tat would be for Washington to counter a Chinese tariff of 10 percent on imports for the United States with a tariff of 10 percent on imports from China. An asymmetric tit-for-tat would be for the United States to counter a Chines shipment of missiles to Iran with an American shipment of F-16s to Vietnam (John Lewis Gaddis, Strategies of Containment: A critical Appraisal of Postwar American National Security Policy. New York: Oxford University Press, (1982). This is also cited in FareedZakaria, “The Reagan Strategy of Containment,” Political Science Quarterly 105, no. 3 (1990), pp. 383-88).

Vote negative

a) Limits – policies the embargo means there’s a near-infinite range of “one exception” affs

b) Ground – unconditional engagement denies us “say no” and backlash arguments which are a crucial part of the engagement debate

### 3

The United States federal government should

- ask the governments of Brazil and Mexico to diplomatically engage Cuba on its behalf in regards to licensing the development of Cuban offshore oil in the North Cuba Basin.

- inform Brazil and Mexico that it will abide by the results of negotiations

- implement any policy changes that negotiations between Brazil, Mexico, and Cuba recommend and

Solves the case and preserves US soft power

Iglesias 12 – Commander of the US Navy (Carlos, “United States Security Policy

Implications of a Post-Fidel Cuba”, 2012, http://www.dtic.mil/cgi-bin/GetTRDoc?AD=ADA560408~~)

Unlike the policy implications above, the major hurdle to this interest does not ¶ come from any continuation of the GOC, but from the rest of the world. International ¶ opposition to the perceived fairness and effectiveness of the economic sanctions has¶ long posed an obstacle for U.S. policy. In the global scale, the problem is epitomized by ¶ the twenty consecutive years of near unanimous UN General Assembly resolution votes ¶ against the embargo. 96 More regionally, Spain and other European Union partners have ¶ strongly pushed to loosen sanctions. The arguments are straightforward and pragmatic, ¶ “since sanctions in place have not worked, it makes more sense to do things that would ¶ work, and (the next obvious one is to) change things.”97 Even more locally, Cuba has ¶ managed to generally retain positive feelings among the people of Latin American in ¶ spite of the country’s domestic realities.98 The rise of Raúl and any subsequent ¶ successions further complicated the problem of mustering international consensus.¶ Several countries in the hemisphere see any new Cuban leadership as fresh opportunities to engage in common interests. The two largest Latin American countries, ¶ Brazil and Mexico, have both ascribed to this approach and have indicated their ¶ interests in forging new ties since Fidel’s stepped down.99¶ On the other hand, this international dissention does hold some prospect for ¶ leveraging U.S. soft power. An indirect approach would be to coordinate U.S. proxy ¶ actions with partner countries interested in Cuba. This has the double benefit of ¶ leveraging U.S. soft power without compromising legislated restrictions or provoking¶ hard-line Cuban-American ire. In this approach, burgeoning relations with Brazil and ¶ Mexico would be strong candidates. Devoid of the “bullhorn diplomacy” that have ¶ marginalized U.S.-Cuban policy efficacy for decades, the U.S. could better engage the ¶ island through hemispherical interlocutors. At a minimum, U.S. interests would be ¶ advanced through the proxy insights of what is occurring on the island in addition to the ¶ potential displacement of anti-American influences (e.g. Chávez).¶ 100Another potential gain for U.S. interests would be to upgrade its diplomatic ¶ presence on the island. For decades, the countries have reciprocated diplomacy ¶ marginalization with low-level “interest sections” in each other capitals. The fallback ¶ reasoning for the U.S. has always been that it did not want to appear to reward the ¶ GOC’s legitimacy with an embassy. This is myopic and inconsistent. The national ¶ strategy clearly promotes engagement in order to “learn about the intentions and nature ¶ of closed regimes, and to plainly demonstrate to the public within those nations that ¶ their governments are to blame for their isolations.¶ 101 Additionally, the diplomatic level is ¶ inconsistent with the longstanding U.S. accreditation of ambassadors to both friendly ¶ and hostile governments.102 An embassy in Cuba could support critical awareness and engagements. In the event of an opportunity or crisis, this presence could be the ¶ difference between knowing where, when, and with whom to act or just watching from ¶ across the Florida Straits.

### 4

#### Trade Promotion Authority likely to pass but obstacles remain – it is vital to Obama’s trade agenda.

Politi, 12/6 (James, US economics and trade correspondent for the Financial Times, “Fast-track opens door for US TPP approval,” http://www.ft.com/intl/cms/s/0/ce008052-5dfd-11e3-8fca-00144feabdc0.html#axzz2miHER8ZD)

Senior US lawmakers have moved closer to a deal to grant President Barack Obama the authority to pass trade agreements swiftly and without changes through Congress, bolstering the White House’s position ahead of a key round of trade negotiations with Pacific nations. The breakthrough in recent days could lead to the presentation of so-called “fast track” legislation before the end of the year, and possibly as early as next week, say people familiar with the discussions. Also known as “Trade Promotion Authority”, such a bill would guarantee that Mr Obama’s sweeping second-term trade agenda, including deals with 12 Pacific countries and the European Union, would move through Congress on an expedited time line and without the possibility of amendments. This could remove a fair amount of the political uncertainty surrounding passage of the trade deals through the US legislature. The potential breakthrough comes as Michael Froman, the US trade representative, heads to Singapore over the weekend for a decisive round of talks on the creation of a Transpacific Partnership to slash tariffs and set trade rules among 12 nations, including Japan. Aides to the Senate finance committee and the House ways and means committee, which cover trade, have been working on a TPA bill for months, and progress has been much slower than expected, raising doubts about the political appetite for trade liberalisation in Congress. The original aim was to have leaders of the panels from both parties bless the deal, but Sandy Levin, the top Democrat on the ways and means committee, is not expected to sign on to the agreement. But Max Baucus, the Democratic chairman of the Senate finance committee, and Orrin Hatch, the panel’s top Republican, are on board, as is Dave Camp, the Republican chairman of the ways and means committee. Aides however cautioned that not all details had been sorted out yet. “We are getting close, but . . . not everything is locked in yet,” said one Republican aide. Another said they were “working to have something as soon as possible”.

#### Plan trades off

LeoGrande, 12

William M. LeoGrande School of Public Affairs American University, Professor of Government and a specialist in Latin American politics and U.S. foreign policy toward Latin America, Professor LeoGrande has been a frequent adviser to government and private sector agencies, 12/18/12, http://www.american.edu/clals/upload/LeoGrande-Fresh-Start.pdf

The Second Obama Administration Where in the executive branch will control over Cuba policy lie? Political considerations played a major role in Obama's Cuba policy during the first term, albeit not as preeminent a consideration as they were during the Clinton years. In 2009, Obama's new foreign policy team got off to a bad start when they promised Senator Menendez that they would consult him before changing Cuba policy. That was the price he extracted for providing Senate Democrats with the 60 votes needed to break a Republican filibuster on a must-pass omnibus appropriations bill to keep the government operating. For the next four years, administration officials worked more closely with Menendez, who opposed the sort of major redirection of policy Obama had promised, than they did with senators like John Kerry (D-Mass.), chair of the Foreign Relations Committee, whose views were more in line with the president's stated policy goals. At the Department of State, Assistant Secretary Arturo Valenzuela favored initiatives to improve relations with Cuba, but he was stymied by indifference or resistance elsewhere in the bureaucracy. Secretary Hillary Clinton, having staked out a tough position Cuba during the Democratic primary campaign, was not inclined to be the driver for a new policy. At the NSC, Senior Director for the Western Hemisphere Dan Restrepo, who advised Obama on Latin America policy during the 2008 campaign, did his best to avoid the Cuba issue because it was so fraught with political danger. When the president finally approved the resumption of people-to-people travel to Cuba, which Valenzuela had been pushing, the White House political team delayed the announcement for several months at the behest of Debbie Wasserman Schultz. Any easing of the travel regulations, she warned, would hurt Democrats' prospects in the upcoming mid-term elections.43 The White House shelved the new regulations until January 2011, and then announced them late Friday before a holiday weekend. Then, just a year later, the administration surrendered to Senator Rubio's demand that it limit the licensing of travel providers in exchange for him dropping his hold on the appointment of Valenzuela's replacement.44 With Obama in his final term and Vice-President Joe Biden unlikely to seek the Democratic nomination in 2016 (unlike the situation Clinton and Gore faced in their second term), politics will presumably play a less central role in deciding Cuba policy over the next four years. There will still be the temptation, however, to sacrifice Cuba policy to mollify congressional conservatives, both Democrat and Republican, who are willing to hold other Obama initiatives hostage to extract concessions on Cuba. And since Obama has given in to such hostage-taking previously, the hostage-takers have a strong incentive to try the same tactic again. The only way to break this cycle would be for the president to stand up to them and refuse to give in, as he did when they attempted to rollback his 2009 relaxation of restrictions on CubanAmerican travel and remittances. Much will depend on who makes up Obama's new foreign policy team, especially at the Department of State. John Kerry has been a strong advocate of a more open policy toward Cuba, and worked behind the scenes with the State Department and USAID to clean up the "democracy promotion" program targeting Cuba, as a way to win the release of Alan Gross. A new secretary is likely to bring new assistant secretaries, providing an opportunity to revitalize the Bureau of Western Hemisphere Affairs, which has been thoroughly cowed by congressional hardliners. But even with new players in place, does Cuba rise to the level of importance that would justify a major new initiative and the bruising battle with conservatives on the Hill? Major policy changes that require a significant expenditure of political capital rarely happen unless the urgency of the problem forces policymakers to take action.

#### Political capital is essential for TPA, which maintains US trade leadership, growth, and hegemony.

Riley and Kim, 13 (Bryan, Jay Van Andel senior policy analyst in trade policy for the Center for International Trade and Economics, and Anthony, senior policy analyst Center for International Trade and Economics, “Advancing Trade Freedom: Key Objective of Trade Promotion Authority Renewal,” http://www.heritage.org/research/reports/2013/04/advancing-trade-freedom-key-objective-of-trade-promotion-authority-renewal)

Trade Promotion Authority (TPA) has been a critical tool for advancing free trade and spreading its benefits to a greater number of Americans. TPA, also known as “fast track” authority, is the legislative power Congress grants to the President to negotiate reciprocal trade agreements. Provided the President observes certain statutory obligations under TPA, Congress agrees to consider implementing those trade pacts without amending them. More than a decade has passed since TPA was last renewed in 2002, and its authority expired in 2007. Reinstituting TPA may well be the most important legislative action on trade for both Congress and the President in 2013 given the urgency of restoring America’s credibility in advancing open markets and securing greater benefits of two-way trade for Americans. As the case for timely reinstallation of an effective and practical TPA is stronger than ever, the quest for renewing TPA should be guided by principles that enhance trade freedom, a vital component of America’s economic freedom. Emerging TPA Renewal Debates Both House Ways and Means Committee chairman David Camp (R–MI) and Senate Finance Committee chairman Max Baucus (D–MT) have announced plans to pursue TPA legislation. However, many lawmakers have correctly pointed out that a proactive push from President Obama is critical, given that trade bills have been a thorny issue for many Democrats in recent years. Historically, it has been common practice, although not formally required, to have the President request that Congress provide renewed TPA. In fact, except for President Obama, every President since Franklin Roosevelt has either requested or received trade negotiating authority.[1] After four years of informing Congress it would seek TPA at “the appropriate time,” early this year the Obama Administration finally indicated its interest in working with Congress to get TPA done. The President’s 2013 trade agenda offered the Administration’s most forward-leaning language yet, specifying that “to facilitate the conclusion, approval, and implementation of market-opening negotiating efforts, we will also work with Congress on Trade Promotion Authority.”[2] In the 2002 Bipartisan Trade Promotion Authority Act, Congress—whose role in formulating U.S. trade policy includes defining trade negotiation objectives—made it clear that [t]he expansion of international trade is vital to the national security of the United States. Trade is critical to the economic growth and strength of the United States and to its leadership in the world. Stable trading relationships promote security and prosperity.… Leadership by the United States in international trade fosters open markets, democracy, and peace throughout the world.[3] Foster Trade Liberalization, Not Protectionism The Obama Administration often seems to regard trade as a zero-sum game of capturing value that would otherwise go elsewhere. However, trade liberalization is about creating and adding value, capitalizing on competitive advantages, and further harnessing the power of freedom and choice. Trade has been an integral part of America’s extraordinary economic progress over the past decades. Since 1929, trade volume has increased from less than 9 percent of U.S. gross domestic product (GDP) to around 30 percent, while real U.S. GDP per person increased from $8,000 to more than $43,000. This progress faces continuing threats, mainly from special-interest groups that malign free trade in an attempt to seek protection from competition at the expense of everyone else. Some lawmakers have even viewed TPA legislation as a vehicle to address the perceived costs of free trade for the U.S. economy. However, using TPA renewal to redress the suspected costs of trade is an ill-advised idea. TPA is an instrument that not only enables America to secure increased access to overseas markets but also provides the unique opportunity for the U.S. to reduce its own barriers and advance economic freedom. Congress and the President can help the American economy by removing barriers that limit its competitiveness. With open trade and investment ensured, the interplay of low tax rates and efficient regulations could effectively enhance America’s economic freedom. Entangling TPA with a protectionist agenda, on the other hand, would not serve America’s interests in the global market. Imports Do Support American Jobs The TPA renewal debate in Congress should reflect the fact that both exports and imports are job-supporting activities. In other words, the debate should focus on how to deliver greater trade freedom to Americans that advances the benefits of trade in both directions. It is a common misperception that importing goods to America comes at the cost of American jobs. In fact, imports contribute to job creation on a large scale. The increased economic activity associated with every stage of the import process helps support millions of jobs in the U.S. As shown by a recent Heritage Foundation study, for instance, over half a million American jobs—in fields such as transportation, wholesale, retail, construction, and finance—are supported by imports of clothes and toys from China alone.[4] Highlighting the dynamic and value-adding role played by imports in the U.S. economy, an empirical analysis published in the Federal Reserve Bank of St. Louis Review presents strong evidence that “policies to bolster exports at the expense of imports would significantly harm U.S. manufacturing,” adding that “imports have played a critical positive role in boosting manufacturing output in the United States—much more so, in fact, than exports.”[5] Indeed, intermediate goods imports and capital goods imports are the lifeblood of U.S. manufacturing. Without them, manufacturing output is impossible. What Congress Should Do in Reauthorizing TPA While working constructively with the Obama Administration, Congress should: Grant long-term (at least five years or even permanent) renewal of TPA so that America’s credibility in pursuing free trade can be effectively restored; Insist on negotiating parameters that promote actual increases in international trade flows and guarantee reductions in tariff and non-tariff barriers to trade and investment; Oppose any emphasis in TPA legislation on the promotion of exports over imports in recognition of the importance of both in increasing American jobs and prosperity; and Resist imposing any special sectoral or industry-specific requirements on negotiators, including in areas such as environmental and labor standards. A Unique Opportunity The threat to U.S. prosperity comes not from free trade but from the decline in economic freedom. In the process of working on TPA reauthorization, Congress has the unique opportunity to become an effective advocate for advancing economic freedom and help America reap the rewards that accrue from such policies. It should not let the opportunity pass.

#### **Collapse of trade causes great power war and US economic decline *in the short term***

PANITCHPAKDI ‘4 (Supachai Panitchpakdi, secretary-general of the UN Conference on Trade and Development, 2/26/2004, American Leadership and the World Trade Organization, p. http://www.wto.org/english/news\_e/spsp\_e/spsp22\_e.htm)

The second point is that strengthening the world trading system is essential to America's wider global objectives. Fighting terrorism, reducing poverty, improving health, integrating China and other countries in the global economy — all of these issues are linked, in one way or another, to world trade. This is not to say that trade is the answer to all America's economic concerns; only that meaningful solutions are inconceivable without it. The world trading system is the linchpin of today's global order — underpinning its security as well as its prosperity. A successful WTO is an example of how multilateralism can work. Conversely, if it weakens or fails, much else could fail with it. This is something which the US — at the epicentre of a more interdependent world — cannot afford to ignore. These priorities must continue to guide US policy — as they have done since the Second World War. America has been the main driving force behind eight rounds of multilateral trade negotiations, including the successful conclusion of the Uruguay Round and the creation of the WTO. The US — together with the EU — was instrumental in launching the latest Doha Round two years ago. Likewise, the recent initiative, spearheaded by Ambassador Zoellick, to re-energize the negotiations and move them towards a successful conclusion is yet another example of how essential the US is to the multilateral process — signalling that the US remains committed to further liberalization, that the Round is moving, and that other countries have a tangible reason to get on board. The reality is this: when the US leads the system can move forward; when it withdraws, the system drifts. The fact that US leadership is essential, does not mean it is easy. As WTO rules have expanded, so too has as the complexity of the issues the WTO deals with — everything from agriculture and accounting, to tariffs and telecommunication. The WTO is also exerting huge gravitational pull on countries to join — and participate actively — in the system. The WTO now has 146 Members — up from just 23 in 1947 — and this could easily rise to 170 or more within a decade. Emerging powers like China, Brazil, and India rightly demand a greater say in an institution in which they have a growing stake. So too do a rising number of voices outside the system as well. More and more people recognize that the WTO matters. More non-state actors — businesses, unions, environmentalists, development NGOs — want the multilateral system to reflect their causes and concerns. A decade ago, few people had even heard of the GATT. Today the WTO is front page news. A more visible WTO has inevitably become a more politicized WTO. The sound and fury surrounding the WTO's recent Ministerial Meeting in Cancun — let alone Seattle — underline how challenging managing the WTO can be. But these challenges can be exaggerated. They exist precisely because so many countries have embraced a common vision. Countries the world over have turned to open trade — and a rules-based system — as the key to their growth and development. They agreed to the Doha Round because they believed their interests lay in freer trade, stronger rules, a more effective WTO. Even in Cancun the great debate was whether the multilateral trading system was moving fast and far enough — not whether it should be rolled back. Indeed, it is critically important that we draw the right conclusions from Cancun — which are only now becoming clearer. The disappointment was that ministers were unable to reach agreement. The achievement was that they exposed the risks of failure, highlighted the need for North-South collaboration, and — after a period of introspection — acknowledged the inescapable logic of negotiation. Cancun showed that, if the challenges have increased, it is because the stakes are higher. The bigger challenge to American leadership comes from inside — not outside — the United States. In America's current debate about trade, jobs and globalization we have heard a lot about the costs of liberalization. We need to hear more about the opportunities. We need to be reminded of the advantages of America's openness and its trade with the world — about the economic growth tied to exports; the inflation-fighting role of imports, the innovative stimulus of global competition. We need to explain that freer trade works precisely because it involves positive change — better products, better job opportunities, better ways of doing things, better standards of living. While it is true that change can be threatening for people and societies, it is equally true that the vulnerable are not helped by resisting change — by putting up barriers and shutting out competition. They are helped by training, education, new and better opportunities that — with the right support policies — can flow from a globalized economy. The fact is that for every job in the US threatened by imports there is a growing number of high-paid, high skill jobs created by exports. Exports supported 7 million workers a decade ago; that number is approaching around 12 million today. And these new jobs — in aerospace, finance, information technology — pay 10 per cent more than the average American wage. We especially need to inject some clarity — and facts — into the current debate over the outsourcing of services jobs. Over the next decade, the US is projected to create an average of more than 2 million new services jobs a year — compared to roughly 200,000 services jobs that will be outsourced. I am well aware that this issue is the source of much anxiety in America today. Many Americans worry about the potential job losses that might arise from foreign competition in services sectors. But it’s worth remembering that concerns about the impact of foreign competition are not new. Many of the reservations people are expressing today are echoes of what we heard in the 1970s and 1980s. But people at that time didn’t fully appreciate the power of American ingenuity. Remarkable advances in technology and productivity laid the foundation for unprecedented job creation in the 1990s and there is no reason to doubt that this country, which has shown time and again such remarkable potential for competing in the global economy, will not soon embark again on such a burst of job-creation. America's openness to service-sector trade — combined with the high skills of its workforce — will lead to more growth, stronger industries, and a shift towards higher value-added, higher-paying employment. Conversely, closing the door to service trade is a strategy for killing jobs, not saving them. Americans have never run from a challenge and have never been defeatist in the face of strong competition. Part of this challenge is to create the conditions for global growth and job creation here and around the world. I believe Americans realize what is at stake. The process of opening to global trade can be disruptive, but they recognize that the US economy cannot grow and prosper any other way. They recognize the importance of finding global solutions to shared global problems. Besides, what is the alternative to the WTO? Some argue that the world's only superpower need not be tied down by the constraints of the multilateral system. They claim that US sovereignty is compromised by international rules, and that multilateral institutions limit rather than expand US influence. Americans should be deeply sceptical about these claims. Almost none of the trade issues facing the US today are any easier to solve unilaterally, bilaterally or regionally. The reality is probably just the opposite. What sense does it make — for example — to negotiate e-commerce rules bilaterally? Who would be interested in disciplining agricultural subsidies in a regional agreement but not globally? How can bilateral deals — even dozens of them — come close to matching the economic impact of agreeing to global free trade among 146 countries? Bilateral and regional deals can sometimes be a complement to the multilateral system, but they can never be a substitute. There is a bigger danger. By treating some countries preferentially, bilateral and regional deals exclude others — fragmenting global trade and distorting the world economy. Instead of liberalizing trade — and widening growth — they carve it up. Worse, they have a domino effect: bilateral deals inevitably beget more bilateral deals, as countries left outside are forced to seek their own preferential arrangements, or risk further marginalization. This is precisely what we see happening today. There are already over two hundred bilateral and regional agreements in existence, and each month we hear of a new or expanded deal. There is a basic contradiction in the assumption that bilateral approaches serve to strengthen the multilateral, rules-based system. Even when intended to spur free trade, they can ultimately risk undermining it. This is in no one's interest, least of all the United States. America led in the creation of the multilateral system after 1945 precisely to avoid a return to hostile blocs — blocs that had done so much to fuel interwar instability and conflict. America's vision, in the words of Cordell Hull, was that “enduring peace and the welfare of nations was indissolubly connected with the friendliness, fairness and freedom of world trade”. Trade would bind nations together, making another war unthinkable. Non-discriminatory rules would prevent a return to preferential deals and closed alliances. A network of multilateral initiatives and organizations — the Marshal Plan, the IMF, the World Bank, and the GATT, now the WTO — would provide the institutional bedrock for the international rule of law, not power. Underpinning all this was the idea that freedom — free trade, free democracies, the free exchange of ideas — was essential to peace and prosperity, a more just world. It is a vision that has emerged pre-eminent a half century later. Trade has expanded twenty-fold since 1950. Millions in Asia, Latin America, and Africa are being lifted out of poverty, and millions more have new hope for the future. All the great powers — the US, Europe, Japan, India, China and soon Russia — are part of a rules-based multilateral trading system, greatly increasing the chances for world prosperity and peace. There is a growing realization that — in our interdependent world — sovereignty is constrained, not by multilateral rules, but by the absence of rules.

### Safety

#### Empirically denied and alternate causality – hundreds of thousands of species die annually

Paltrowitz, 01 (JD Brooklyn Journal of I-Law, 2001 (A Greening of the World Trade Organisation”)

However, the panel did not take into account the practical reality that negotiations are time-consuming. The environment, animal life and human life can all be irreparably harmed as time passes. n105 For instance, one scholar has reported [\*1807] that "the world is losing between 27,000 and 150,000 species per year, approximately seventy-four species every day, and three every hour and up to seventy percent of the world's fisheries are depleted or under stress after years of over-exploitation." n106 This concern is especially pertinent in the case of the eastern spinner dolphin and coastal spotted dolphin, which are on the endangered species list. n107 Yet, even for the dolphin species that are not endangered, a similar concern applies because if dolphins continue to be maimed or killed in tuna purse seines then their numbers could become seriously depleted to the point where they may be put on the endangered species list. In short, Tuna-Dolphin I shows the preeminence of trade values at the expense of environmental values. Therefore, the panel's acknowledgment of the WTO's Preamble rang hollow when it stated: " . . . that the provisions of the GATT impose few constraints on a contracting party's implementation of domestic environmental policies." n108

#### 2. Species extinction won't cause human extinction – humans and the environment are adaptable

Doremus, 2K (Holly, Professor of Law at UC Davis Washington & Lee Law Review, Winter 57 Wash & Lee L. Rev. 11, lexis)

In recent years, this discourse frequently has taken the form of the ecological horror story . That too is no mystery. The ecological horror story is unquestionably an attention-getter, especially in the hands of skilled writers [\*46] like Carson and the Ehrlichs. The image of the airplane earth, its wings wobbling as rivet after rivet is carelessly popped out, is difficult to ignore. The apocalyptic depiction of an impending crisis of potentially dire proportions is designed to spur the political community to quick action . Furthermore, this story suggests a goal that appeals to many nature lovers: that virtually everything must be protected. To reinforce this suggestion, tellers of the ecological horror story often imply that the relative importance of various rivets to the ecological plane cannot be determined. They offer reams of data and dozens of anecdotes demonstrating the unexpected value of apparently useless parts of nature. The moth that saved Australia from prickly pear invasion, the scrubby Pacific yew, and the downright unattractive leech are among the uncharismatic flora and fauna who star in these anecdotes. n211 The moral is obvious: because we cannot be sure which rivets are holding the plane together, saving them all is the only sensible course. Notwithstanding its attractions, the material discourse in general, and the ecological horror story in particular, are not likely to generate policies that will satisfy nature lovers. The ecological horror story implies that there is no reason to protect nature until catastrophe looms. The Ehrlichs' rivet-popper account, for example, presents species simply as the (fungible) hardware holding together the ecosystem. If we could be reasonably certain that a particular rivet was not needed to prevent a crash, the rivet-popper story suggests that we would lose very little by pulling it out. Many environmentalists, though, would disagree. Reluctant to concede such losses, tellers of the ecological horror story highlight how close a catastrophe might be, and how little we know about what actions might trigger one. But the apocalyptic vision is less credible today than it seemed in the 1970s. Although it is clear that the earth is experiencing a mass wave of extinctions, the complete elimination of life on earth seems unlikely. Life is remarkably robust. Nor is human extinction probable any time soon. Homo sapiens is adaptable to nearly any environment. Even if the world of the future includes far fewer species, it likely will hold people. One response to this credibility problem tones the story down a bit, arguing not that humans will go extinct but that ecological disruption will bring economies, and consequently civilizations, to their knees. But this too may be overstating the case. Most ecosystem functions are performed by multiple species. This functional redundancy means that a high proportion of species can be lost without precipitating a collapse.

#### 3. Collapse is common – won’t spillover

### Russia

#### Russia is far too weak to attack the US

Lieber, 07 (Professor of Government and International Affairs at Georgetown University - Robert J., "Persistent Primacy and the Future of the American Era", APSA Paper 2007, http://www.allacademic.com//meta/p\_mla\_apa\_research\_citation/2/1/1/0/5/pages211058/p211058-1.php)

Constraints on the capacity of adversaries also needs to be taken into account. Russia under Putin has put pressure on its immediate neighbors and seeks to rebuild its armed forces, but Moscow’s ability to regain the superpower status of the former Soviet Union remains limited. The Russian armed forces are in woeful condition, the total population is half that of the USSR and declining by 700,000 per year, the economy is overwhelmingly dependent on revenues from oil and natural gas and thus vulnerable if world market prices soften, and the long term stability of its crony capitalism and increasingly authoritarian political system are uncertain. China, despite extraordinary economic growth and modernization, will continue to depend on rapid expansion of trade and the absorption of vast numbers of people moving from the countryside to the cities. It may well become a major military challenger of the United States, first regionally and even globally, but only over the long term.

#### World oil prices high—job reports, economy, Brent and WTI

Channel News Asia 12/7 ("Oil prices gain after bullish US jobs report", 12/7/13, [www.channelnewsasia.com/news/business/international/oil-prices-gain-after/913342.html //](http://www.channelnewsasia.com/news/business/international/oil-prices-gain-after/913342.html%20/) candle)

NEW YORK: World oil prices pushed higher on Friday after a solid jobs report for November signalled unexpected strength in the US economy. The US unemployment rate fell sharply to 7.0 per cent from 7.3 per cent in October, and the number of jobs generated last month, 203,000, was well above expectations. New York's main contract, West Texas Intermediate (WTI) crude for delivery in January, added 27 cents to close at $97.65 a barrel. Brent North Sea crude for January finished at $111.61 a barrel, up 63 cents from Thursday's close. The European benchmark Brent retained broad support from concerns about a supply disruption in the North Sea. Fierce winter storms continued to batter northern Europe with hurricane-force winds Friday, leaving at least 10 people dead and hundreds of thousands suffering power blackouts and road, rail and air transport chaos. The US WTI strength came from the jobs numbers, which together with other data have suggested economic growth is firming, a good sign for the country's huge oil market.

#### American technology is key to Cuban oil development—plan unlocks exports

Padgett 8 (Tim is a TIME contributor and Miami and Latin America Bureau Chief; 10/23/08; http://www.time.com/time/world/article/0,8599,1853252,00.html// candle)

The Spanish energy company Repsol-YPF has entered into a production-sharing agreement with Cupet and is scheduled to start drilling the first real well in the EEZ next year. Other international firms, including Norway's StatoilHidro and India's Oil & Natural Gas Corp., are part of the Repsol-led consortium. Venezuela's state-run Petroleos de Venezuela is considered a lesser player because it has little deep-water drilling experience. (China is also interested but so far only involved in onshore drilling in Cuba.) Cuba is now in important negotiations with Brazil's Petrobras, which just made its own multibillion-barrel oil find off its coast near Rio de Janeiro and could, analysts say, be the major offshore drilling partner for Cuba if it jumps in.¶ Still, the concessions so far represent less than a quarter of the 59 drilling blocks that Cuba hopes to exploit in the 43,000-sq.-mi. (112,000 sq km) EEZ. Analysts say one reason is the daunting infrastructural difficulties facing any company that drills in Cuba: firms have to bring much more of their own capital, equipment, technology and on-the-ground know-how than usual. This year's severe hurricane damage in Cuba has made the situation worse. Canada's Sherritt, in fact, recently dropped out of its four-block contract. "Who else is going to be willing to actually come in and take the risk in Cuba?" says Benjamin-Alvarado. "In terms of proximity and technology, the only people really able to do it to the extent the Cubans need are the Americans

#### That causes Saudi Arabia to flood the oil market and collapse prices

**Morse and Richards 2** (Edward L. Morse is Executive Adviser at Hess Energy Trading Company and was Deputy Assistant Secretary of State for International Energy Policy in 1979-81. James Richard is a portfolio manager at Firebird Management, an investment fund active in eastern Europe, Russia, and Central Asia, Foreign Affairs, March/April)

A simple fact explains this conclusion: 63 percent of the world's proven oil reserves are in the Middle East, 25 percent (or 261 billion barrels) in Saudi Arabia alone. As the largest single resource holder, Saudi Arabia has a unique petroleum policy that is designed to maximize the benefit of holding so much of the world's oil supply. Saudi Arabia's goal is to assure that oil's role in the international economy is maintained as long as possible. Hence Saudi policy has always denounced efforts by industrialized countries to wean themselves from oil dependence, whether through tax policy or regulation. Saudi strategy focuses on three different political arenas. The first involves the ties between the Saudi kingdom and other OPEC countries. The second concerns Riyadh's relationship with the non- OPEC producers: Mexico, Norway, and now Russia. Finally, there is Saudi Arabia's link to the major oil-importing regions -- most importantly North America, but also Europe and Asia. Given the size of the Saudi oil sector, the kingdom has a unique and critical role in setting world oil prices. Since its overriding objectives are maximizing revenues generated from oil exports and extending the life of its petroleum reserves, Riyadh aims to keep prices high as long as possible. But the price cannot be so high that it stifles demand or encourages other competitive sources of supply. Nor can it be so low that the kingdom cannot achieve minimum revenue targets. The critical balancing act of Saudi foreign policy, therefore, is to maintain oil prices within a reasonable price band. Stopping oil prices from falling below the minimum level requires cooperation from other OPEC countries and occasionally from non-OPEC producers. Preventing oil prices from rising too high requires keeping enough spare production capacity to use in an emergency. This latter feature is the signal characteristic of Saudi policy. The kingdom can afford to maintain this spare capacity because of the abundance of its oil reserves and the comparatively low cost of developing and producing its reserve base. In today's soft market, in which Saudi Arabia produces around 7.4 mbd, the kingdom has close to 3 mbd of spare capacity. Its spare capacity is usually ample enough to entirely displace the production of another large oil-exporting country if supply is disrupted or a producer tries to reduce output to increase prices. Not only does this spare capacity help the kingdom keep prices in check, but it also serves to link Riyadh with the United States and other key oil-importing countries. It is a blunt instrument that makes policymakers elsewhere beholden to Riyadh for energy security. This spare capacity is greater than the total exports of all other oil-exporting countries -- except Russia. Saudi spare capacity is the energy equivalent of nuclear weapons, a powerful deterrent against those who try to challenge Saudi leadership and Saudi goals. It is also the centerpiece of the U.S.- Saudi relationship. The United States relies on that capacity as the cornerstone of its oil policy. That arrangement was fine as long as U.S. protection meant Riyadh would not "blackmail" Washington -- an assumption that is more difficult to accept after September 11. Saudi Arabia's OPEC partners must also cooperate with the kingdom in part to prevent Riyadh from producing a glut and having prices collapse; spare capacity also serves to pressure key non-OPEC producers to cooperate with Saudi Arabia when necessary. But unlike the nuclear deterrent, the Saudi weapon is actively used when required. The kingdom has periodically (and brutally) demonstrated that it can use its spare capacity to destroy exports from countries challenging its market share. This tactic is the weapon that Saudi Arabia could use if Moscow ignores Riyadh's requests for cooperation. Saudi Arabia has triggered its spare capacity twice in recent history, once when prices were especially low. Both cases demonstrated that the kingdom will accept those low prices so long as it suffers less than its targets do. In 1985, Saudi Arabia successfully waged a price war designed to force other oil producers to stop "free riding" on Saudi oil policy. That policy meant that those states had to cooperate with the kingdom by reining in production enough to allow Saudi Arabia to produce the minimum level that it targeted. Oil prices fell by more than half within a few months, and Saudi Arabia immediately regained the market share it had lost in the preceding four years, mainly to non-OPEC countries.

#### Low oil prices wreck the Russian economy—high prices create a window for sustained growth

**IMF, 11** - International Monetary Fund (9/27/11, "Russia Should Leverage Commodity Boom to Boost Growth", http://www.imf.org/external/pubs/ft/survey/so/2011/int092711a.htm, KONTOPOULOS)

**Russia’s economy grew** by 4 percent in 2010, **aided by the boom in** commodity **prices, in** particular **oil.** For 2011, the IMF is projecting growth of 4.3 percent. But Russia could do much better. Before the global financial crisis, the economy was growing at more than 7 percent per year, and it could take off again if economic policies and the supporting policy institutions are strengthened. **Russia** also **remains overly reliant on oil revenues, which makes it vulnerable to a** slowdown in economic growth and a **sudden drop in** commodity **prices**. In an interview, **IMF mission chief for Russia** Juha **Kähkönen and deputy mission chief** Daria **Zakharova discuss the outlook for Russia’s economy, and weigh risks** such as continued crisis in the euro area or a pronounced slowdown in the global economy. IMF Survey online: What is the outlook for Russia’s economy? **Kähkönen: Russia is still benefiting from high oil prices**, but its post-crisis economic performance has been disappointing, with only moderate growth and high inflation. Russia saw a major decline in output of about 8 percent of GDP during the global crisis, and is still catching up. The economy grew by 4 percent in 2010 and is projected to grow by 4.3 percent this year. Growth has suffered as a result of a bad harvest in 2010 brought on by drought. The economy is also slowing down now because of the ongoing turmoil in advanced countries. Going forward, Russia’s outlook will depend not just on the external environment but also on economic policies. If current policies—a high nonoil fiscal deficit and no clear medium-term anchor for fiscal policy, monetary policy that is insufficiently focused on reducing inflation, a financial sector lacking adequate oversight, and stalled structural reforms—are maintained, the result will be muddling through, with growth tapering off to below 4 percent in the medium term. But if there is a major strengthening of the economic policies, Russia’s potential is huge. The country could easily grow by an annual rate of 6 percent or more on a sustained basis if the right policies are put in place. IMF Survey online: How vulnerable is the economy to ongoing turmoil in Europe and the slowdown in global growth? Zakharova: **If the crisis** in the euro area intensifies and **leads to** another global downturn and **a precipitous fall in oil prices, Russia’s economy could be severely affected.** Russia could also be impacted through the financial channel. Although Russia’s direct exposure to European sovereign debt is limited, a severe distress in a large bank in a core euro area country could have serious repercussions for Russia’s banking system. IMF Survey online: What are your main recommendations to the Russian authorities on the macroeconomic policy mix? Kähkönen: **High oil prices give Russia a window of opportunity to put the economy on a higher growth path**. Policies should be strengthened in four main policy areas: monetary policy, fiscal policy, structural reforms to improve the business climate, and banking sector supervision. We think it would be most beneficial to have action simultaneously in all of these areas because the reforms would be mutually reinforcing. Russia’s macroeconomic policies would also benefit from more stable and predictable frameworks. Right now, there are too many ad hoc policy decisions. In terms of monetary policy, we think the central bank should focus squarely on inflation. In the past, the bank has had multiple targets, which has diluted the emphasis on price stability. Russia’s underlying inflation currently is high at about 8 percent. Zakharova: The fiscal policy framework should also be strengthened. Right now, policy focus is on the overall fiscal balance. But because Russia is an oil producer, it is more appropriate to look at the nonoil deficit—the size of the deficit before taking oil revenues into account. This deficit increased by 9 percent of GDP during the crisis, with Russia implementing one of the largest fiscal stimuli in the Group of 20 (G-20) leading industrial and emerging market countries. Our advice is to refocus fiscal policy on the nonoil balance and introduce an ambitious, credible, and growth-friendly fiscal consolidation that aims at reaching a nonoil deficit of 4.7 percent, the current long-term fiscal target of the government. We also recommend that Russia refrain from enacting further supplementary budgets, which in the past have been used to spend excess oil revenues. Supplementary budgets make fiscal policy pro-cyclical, thus undermining macroeconomic stability. IMF Survey online: Russia has been riding high on the commodity boom, but **what will happen if prices start to falter?** Zakharova: **Russia has been rescued** from the recent financial crisis **by a strong recovery in oil prices, but in the process the economy has become much more vulnerable to a sudden drop in** commodity **prices.** **Russia’s nonoil deficit has** almost **tripled** following the crisis. Just to put this in perspective, **if oil prices were to fall to $40 per barrel as they did during the most recent financial crisis, Russia would be running deficits in the order of 8 percent of GDP.** At the same time, **the Oil Reserve Fund, which Russia** successfully **used to cushion the economy** in the most recent downturn, **has been** almost **exhausted. This means that the government would have to borrow from the markets**—and possibly at high rates—**if there is a** precipitous **drop in oil prices. The external current account would also be severely affected by a decline in oil prices.** We would expect that the current high surplus would turn into a deficit fairly quickly, putting pressure on the exchange rate.

#### Causes multiple scenarios for CBW conflict Oliker and Charlick-Paley 02 (Olga and Tanya, RAND Corporation Project Air Force, “Assessing Russia’s Decline,” www.rand.org/pubs/monograph\_reports/MR1442/)

The preceding chapters have illustrated the ways in which Russia’s decline affects that country and may evolve into challenges and dangers that extend well beyond its borders. The political factors of decline may make Russia a less stable international actor and other factors may increase the risk of internal unrest. Together and separately, they increase the risk of conflict and the potential scope of other imaginable disasters. The trends of regionalization, particularly the disparate rates of economic growth among regions, combined with the politicization of regional economic and military interests, will be important to watch. The potential for locale, or possibly ethnicity, to serve as a rallying point for internal conflict is low at present, but these factors have the potential to feed into precisely the cycle of instability that political scientists have identified as making states in transition to democracy more likely to become involved in war. These factors also increase the potential for domestic turmoil, which further increases the risk of international conflict, for instance if Moscow seeks to united a divided nation and/or demonstrate globally that its waning power remains something to be reckoned with. Given Russia’s conventional weakness, an increased risk of conflict carries with it an increased risk of nuclear weapons use, and Russia’s demographic situation increases the potential for a major epidemic with possible implications for Europe and perhaps beyond. The dangers posed by Russia’s civilian and military nuclear weapons complex, aside from the threat of nuclear weapons use, create a real risk of proliferation of weapons or weapons materials to terrorist groups, as well as perpetuating an increasing risk of accident at one of Russia’s nuclear power plants or other facilities. These elements touch upon key security interests, thus raising serious concerns for the United States. A declining Russia increases the likelihood of conflict—internal or otherwise—and the general deterioration that Russia has in common with “failing” states raises serious questions about its capacity to respond to an emerging crisis. A crisis in large, populous, and nuclear-armed Russia can easily affect the interests of the United States and its allies. In response to such a scenario, the United States, whether alone or as part of a larger coalition, could be asked to send military forces to the area in and around Russia. This chapter will explore a handful of scenarios that could call for U.S. involvement. A wide range of crisis scenarios can be reasonably extrapolated from the trends implicit in Russia’s decline. A notional list includes: Authorized or unauthorized belligerent actions by Russia troops in trouble-prone Russian regions or in neighboring states could lead to armed conflict. Border clashes with China in the Russian Far East or between Russia and Ukraine, the Baltic states, Kazakhstan, or another neighbor could escalate into interstate combat. Nuclear-armed terrorists based in Russia or using weapons or materials diverted from Russian facilities could threaten Russia, Europe, Asia, or the United States. Civil war in Russia could involve fighting near storage sites for nuclear, chemical, or biological weapons and agents, risking large-scale contamination and humanitarian disaster. A nuclear accident at a power plant or facility could endanger life and health in Russia and neighboring states. A chemical accident at a plant or nuclear or nuclear-related facility could endanger life and health in Rusisa and neighboring states. Ethnic pogrom in south Russia could force refugees into Georgia, Azerbaijan, Armenia, and/or Ukraine. Economic and ethnic conflicts in Caucasus could erupt into armed clashes, which would endanger oil and gas pipelines in the region. A massive ecological disaster such as an earthquake, famine, or epidemic could spawn refugees and spread illness and death across borders. An increasingly criminalized Russian economy could create a safe haven for crime or even terrorist-linked groups. From this base, criminals, drug traders, and terrorists could threaten the people and economies of Europe, Asia, and the United States. Accelerated Russian weapons and technology sales or unauthorized diversion could foster the proliferation of weapons and weapon materials to rogue states and nonstate terrorist actors, increasing the risk of nuclear war.

#### Mutual interests ensure cooperation

Arbatov, 07 (Alexei, corresponding member of the Russian Academy of Sciences, member of the Editorial Board of Russia in Global Affairs, “Is a New Cold War Imminent,” Russia in Global Affairs, No. 2, July-September 2007, http://eng.globalaffairs.ru/numbers/20/1130.html)

First, the present dispute lacks the Cold War’s system-forming element, that is, bipolarity. In addition to the global and transregional centers of economic and military force, such as the U.S., the EU, Japan, Russia and China, the world is witnessing the growth of regional leaders, among them India, Pacific ‘small tigers,’ member states of the Association of Southeast Asian Nations (ASEAN), Iran, Brazil, South Africa and Nigeria. Additionally, the mighty currents of globalization and the information revolution are eroding traditional forms of interstate relations. Nor can we discount the ubiquitous growth of nationalism, and the increased role of transnational economic, political and even military actors. Russian-U.S. relations no longer represent the central axis of global politics. It is just one of its many facets – and not the most important one in many issues. Apart from some contradictions, Russia and the West share major common interests. Finally, they have other competitors beside themselves. Thus, a zero-sum game is out of the question. Whatever disagreements may divide Russia and the West, they are on the same side of the barricades in the ongoing international conflicts. In Afghanistan, for example, they act jointly, seeking to prevent a resurgence of Taliban and al-Qaeda activities. On other issues, such as the nuclear programs of North Korea and Iran, and the situations involving Palestine and Nagorno-Karabakh, they are attempting to solve these problems through multilateral negotiations. The once irreconcilable ideological rivalry between the two parties is now relegated to the past. The real ideological divide now lies between liberal-democratic values and Islamic radicalism, between the North and the South, and between the forces of globalization and anti-globalization. Russia may not be fertile ground for liberal values, but it will certainly never embrace radical Islam. Over the last 20 years, Russia has sustained the greatest losses in the struggle against Islamic extremism (the war in Afghanistan, and the wars and conflicts in Chechnya, Dagestan and Tajikistan).With regard to the arms race, despite the current growth in U.S. and Russian defense spending, the present situation is not remotely comparable to what took place during the Cold War. In the period from 1991 to 2012, that is, since the signing in Moscow of the Strategic Arms Reduction Treaty (START-I) until the expiry of the Strategic Offensive Reductions Treaty (SORT, also known as the Moscow Treaty), signed in 2002, the strategic and tactical nuclear weapons of the two countries will be reduced by about 80 percent [the Moscow Treaty expires on December 31, 2012].>>

### Cooperation

#### 1. Terrorists won’t pursue or use nuclear weapons

Waltz, 03 (Kenneth, The Spread of Nuclear Weapons: A Debate Renewed, 2003, p. 130)

For terrorists who abandon tactics of disruption and harassment in favor of dealing in wholesale death and destruction, instruments other than nuclear weapons are more readily available. Poisons and germs are easier to get than nuclear weapons, and poisoning a city’s water supply, though rather complicated, is more easily done than blowing a city up. Nevertheless, terrorists may seek to gain control of nuclear materials and use them to threaten or destroy. Yet, with shaky control of nuclear weapons materials in Russia and perhaps in Pakistan, and with the revelation in 1994 that the United States had lost track of some of its nuclear materials, one can hardly believe that nuclear weapons spreading to another country or two every now and then adds much to the chances that terrorists will be able to buy or steal nuclear materials. Plentiful sources are already available. Nuclear terror is a problem distinct from the spread of nuclear weapons to a few more countries. Terrorists have done a fair bit of damage by using conventional weapons and have sometimes got their way by threatening to use them. Might terrorists not figure they can achieve more still by threatening to explode nuclear weapons on cities of countries they may wish to bend to their bidding? Fear of nuclear terror arises from the assumption that if terrorists *can* get nuclear weapons they *will* get them, and then all hell will break loose. This is comparable to assuming that if weak states get nuclear weapons, they will use them for aggression. Both assumptions are false. Would the courses of action we fear, if followed, promise more gains than losses or more pains than profits? The answers are obvious. Terrorists have some hope of reaching their long-term goals through patient pressure and constant harassment. They cannot hope to do so by issuing unsustainable threats to wreak great destruction, threats they would not want to execute anyway.

#### 2. No risk of nuclear terrorism—can’t get material, can’t make the bomb, and can’t bring it into the US

Chapman, 08(Steve, member of the Chicago Tribune editorial board since 1981, “The Implausibility of Nuclear Terrorism”, http://www.realclearpolitics.com/articles/2008/02/the\_implausibility\_of\_nuclear.html)

But remember: After Sept. 11, 2001, we all thought more attacks were a certainty. Yet al-Qaida and its ideological kin have proved unable to mount a second strike. Given their inability to do something simple -- say, shoot up a shopping mall or set off a truck bomb -- it's reasonable to ask if they have a chance at something much more ambitious. Far from being plausible, argued Ohio State University professor John Mueller in a recent presentation at the University of Chicago, "the likelihood that a terrorist group will come up with an atomic bomb seems to be vanishingly small." The events required to make that happen comprise a multitude of Herculean tasks. First, a terrorist group has to get a bomb or fissile material, perhaps from Russia's inventory of decommissioned warheads. If that were easy, one would have already gone missing. Besides, those devices are probably no longer a danger, since weapons that are not scrupulously maintained (as those have not been) quickly become what one expert calls "radioactive scrap metal." If terrorists were able to steal a Pakistani bomb, they would still have to defeat the arming codes and other safeguards designed to prevent unauthorized use. As for Iran, no nuclear state has ever given a bomb to an ally -- for reasons even the Iranians can grasp. Stealing some 100 pounds of bomb fuel would require help from rogue individuals inside some government who are prepared to jeopardize their own lives. The terrorists, notes Mueller, would then have to spirit it "hundreds of miles out of the country over unfamiliar terrain, and probably while being pursued by security forces." Then comes the task of building a bomb. It's not something you can gin up with spare parts and power tools in your garage. It requires millions of dollars, a safe haven and advanced equipment -- plus people with specialized skills, lots of time and a willingness to die for the cause. And if al-Qaida could make a prototype, another obstacle would emerge: There is no guarantee it would work, and there is no way to test it. Assuming the jihadists vault over those Himalayas, they would have to deliver the weapon onto American soil. Sure, drug smugglers bring in contraband all the time -- but seeking their help would confront the plotters with possible exposure or extortion. This, like every other step in the entire process, means expanding the circle of people who know what's going on, multiplying the chance someone will blab, back out or screw up. Mueller recalls that after the Irish Republican Army failed in an attempt to blow up British Prime Minister Margaret Thatcher, it said, "We only have to be lucky once. You will have to be lucky always." Al-Qaida, he says, faces a very different challenge: For it to carry out a nuclear attack, everything has to go right. For us to escape, only one thing has to go wrong. That has heartening implications. If Osama bin Laden embarks on the project, he has only a minuscule chance of seeing it bear fruit. Given the formidable odds, he probably won't bother.

#### Empirical trends disprove warming impacts

Goklany 11 - a science and technology policy analyst for the United States Department of the Interior (Indur M., “Misled on Climate Change: How the UN IPCC (and others) Exaggerate the Impacts of Global Warming” December 2011, <http://goklany.org/library/Reason%20CC%20and%20Development%202011.pdf>, PZ)

Discussion and Conclusions **Despite claims that GW will reduce human well-being in poor countries, there is no evidence that this is actually happening**. Empirical trends **show that by any objective climate-sensitive measure, human well-being in such countries has improved remarkably over the last several decades**. Specifically, **agricultural productivity has increased; the proportion of people suffering from chronic hunger has declined; the rate of extreme poverty has been more than halved; rates of death and disease from malaria, other vector-borne diseases and extreme weather events have declined.** Together, these improvements correspond with life expectancy in poor countries more than doubling since 1900. **The fact that these improvements have occurred in spite of GW indicates that economic and technological development has been**, overall, **a very significant benefit to people in poor countries.**

#### Global Warming is a natural process – Antarctica proves

Kelly 12(Conor “NASA’s Antarctic Study Casts Doubt on Global Warming” ForexTV.com 6/19/12 <http://www.forextv.com/forex-news-story/nasa-s-antarctic-study-casts-doubt-on-global-warming>)

**A recent study published by University of Southern California researchers suggests that Antarctica featured drastically different conditions in its past—particularly during the Miocene Era. The study,** conducted with the purpose of predicting conditions following further climate change**, found that global temperature changes in the past have drastically altered the climates of the poles.** By drilling into the crust beneath Antarctic ice sheets, **the scientists were able to analyze waxed leaf fossils, suggesting that the climate allowed for vegetation**. Past experiments have reached difficulties using this technique, as shifting ice sheets destroy fossils. However, Sarah J. Feakins, leader of the study, was tipped off by pollen samples that suggested hints of plant life**. By looking at hydrogen isotopes present in the plant matter, the team was able to determine air and water conditions during the plant’s life. In a paper published in Nature Geoscience, the researchers reported hotter and wetter conditions in Antarctica’s past than were previously believed. The research has been used by many to claim evidence that global warming is part of a natural phenomenon involving cyclic climate change. Carbon monoxide readings during the Miocene Era fall somewhere between 400 and 600 parts per million (ppm). Readings today are steadily reaching 393 ppm, one of the highest readings in several million years, a trend geologists say match with this period in Earth’s history. USC researchers suggest that at the current rate, global temperatures will reach Miocene Era levels by the end of this century.**

#### Extensive checks prove no loose nukes

**Frost, 05** (Robin, teaches political science at Simon Fraser University, British Colombia, “Nuclear Terrorism after 9/11,” Adelphi Papers, December)

In fact, all the evidence is that the weapons were indeed safely withdrawn. In 2002, the INC ‘assessed’ that, by June 1992, ‘the last of the former Soviet tactical nuclear warheads were withdrawn to Russia, and…by the end of 1996, the last of the strategic nuclear warheads had been removed from Kazakhstan, Ukraine, and Belarus.’ The NIC’s 2004 report on Russian nuclear security quotes former Minister of Atomic Energy Yevgeny Adamov as saying: ‘Neither Bin Ladin nor anyone else could steal a nuclear warhead from anywhere in the former Soviet Union. During my time as minister, I carried out a comprehensive stock-taking of everything we had and had had, and traced the history of all the warheads ever produced. So, everything there was on the territories of the former USSR republics was returned to Russia…Nothing was stolen from us. So, neither Bin Ladin, nor Iraq nor Iran could make use of these explosive devices.’